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Water markets in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) and the US west are compared in terms of 
their ability to allocate scarce water resources among competing uses.  Both locations have been in the 
forefront of the development of water markets with defined water rights and conveyance structures to 
assist  in  the  reallocation  of  water  across  competing  demands.  They  also  share  the  challenge  of 
managing  water  with  climate  variability  and  climate  change.    As  these  two  markets  occur  in 
developed,  wealthy  countries,  their  experiences  in  water  markets  with  different  water  rights 
(appropriative,  riparian  and  statutory  rights)  provide  ‘best-case’  scenarios  of  what  institutional 
arrangements work best, indicate which are less effective, and demonstrate what might be possible for 
greater use of water markets elsewhere in the world. The paper finds that the gains from trade in the 
MDB is worth hundreds of millions of dollars in per year, total turnover in water rights exceeds $2 
billion  per  year  and  the  volume  of  trade  accounts  for  over  20%  of  surface  water  extractions  by 
irrigators. In the key states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, and Texas, trades of committed 
water annually range between 5% and 15% of total state freshwater diversions with over $4.3 billion 
(2008 $) spent or committed by urban buyers between 1987 and 2008. Despite the clear benefits of 
water markets in both locations, there are on-going restrictions to trade that limit the potential gains 
and also third-party effects from use that require resolution. 
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 1. Introduction 
There is growing worldwide concern about freshwater supplies and their ability to meet new demands.  
Although fresh water is abundant at a global level, only a tiny amount, less than 0.3 %, is easily 
accessible for human use [Dinar et al., 2007]. An increasing amount of this water is utilized, with 
global  water  withdrawals  tripling  since  1950.  Presently,  70%  of  the  world’s  population  lives  in 
countries that withdraw more than 40% of the available water resources. If current trends continue, by 
2025 up to a third of humanity will be living in regions where water withdrawals exceed 60% of the 
amount available [Shiklomanov, 2003]. 
 
Climate change is likely to exacerbate water shortages by making precipitation more variable, with a 
forecasted  reduction  in  growing-season  precipitation  in  key  agricultural  areas  such  as  Southern 
Australia and the western US [Barnett et al., 2008; World Water Assessment Program, 2009], and 
increased  water  stress  in  many  other  locations  should  rapid  warming  occur  [Fung  et  al.,  2010].  
Various actions are under consideration to augment supplies and to contain the growth in demand 
through desalinization; increased dam, reservoir, and aqueduct construction; and more conservation 
and metering of current water use.  Investment  in desalination alone is expected to be worth $90 
billion over the period 2010-2016 [Pike research, 2010] while total investments in all forms of water 
infrastructure are estimated at $75 billion annually [World Water Vision, 2000].  Given the high cost 
of supply augmentation, alternative approaches must be developed for relatively low value but high 
consumptive uses of water uses, such as in agriculture, where much current consumption takes place. 
 
Markets  that  allow  water  to  be  traded  from  low-to-higher-value  uses  are  an  important  means  to 
mitigate the effects of scarcity by facilitating a greater net value of production from a given supply, 
encouraging investment, and generating price signals about opportunity costs. Water markets can be   2 
limited to particular types of consumptive uses, such as for agriculture, or be applied across a range of 
alternative consumptive uses such as between rural and urban sectors, and also in situ uses. Given that 
irrigation accounts for about 70% of all freshwater globally appropriated for human use [World Water 
Assessment Program, 2006, p. 245], with at least some of it applied to comparatively low-valued 
irrigated farming, there can be substantial gains from trade for both sellers and buyers of water from 
voluntary rural-urban trades.  
 
The  growing  interest  in  water  markets  has  arisen  from  the  recognition  that  ‘cap  and  trade’ 
mechanisms can promote economic efficiency across competing uses for a variety of natural resources 
[Costello et al., 2008; Stavins, 2007]. Markets help mitigate water scarcity because they allow users 
with higher marginal values in use to purchase or lease water rights from those who have lower 
marginal values and, thereby, increase the aggregate benefits of water applications.  These trades also 
produce important information about relative water values for regulators and judges in setting policy 
and resolving disputes across competing uses and ‘in situ’ use. Consequently, water markets can 
facilitate more rapid and flexible adaptation to new demands and to climate change, processes that are 
especially important for arid and semi-arid regions.  
   
Two areas of the world that have been in the forefront of the development of water markets include 
Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) and the US West. Unlike many other places, both locations 
have  defined  water  rights  and  conveyance  structures  to  assist  in  the  reallocation  of  water  across 
competing demands. They also face growing water scarcity associated with climate variability and 
climate change.  As these two regions exist in developed, wealthy countries, their experiences in 
water markets provide ‘best-case’ scenarios of what institutional arrangements work best, indicate 
which are less effective, and demonstrate what might be possible for greater use of water markets   3 
elsewhere in the world. There are also important differences in the two regions regarding the nature of 
water rights and the extent of water markets that provide guidance as to what approaches have coped 
effectively with increasing water scarcity. We provide the first detailed comparison of their water 
rights and regulatory structures; the extent of water trading; and estimate the gains from further trades 
in the MDB and the US West. The insights from our evaluation provide guidance as to the potential of 
water markets to mitigate water scarcity among competing users. 
 
In  the  following  section  we  outline  our  theoretical  framework  and  methods  of  analysis  and 
comparison.  Section  III  focuses  on  the  extent  of  water  trading  and  the  underlying  institutional 
framework in the two regions. Section IV outlines existing patterns of water trading. Section V gives 
evidence of further gains from trade by examining water price data in urban and agricultural uses and 
provides estimates of the economic gains from trade. Section VI turns to the institutional framework 
that exists in the two countries to help explain the differential patterns observed.  Concluding remarks 
about Australian and US water market experiences are provided in section VII.  
 
2. Methods 
2.1.  Theoretical Concepts 
All  markets  require  an  exchangeable  right  to  a  flow  of  benefits  in  excess  of  transactions  costs; 
otherwise there is no basis for trade.  The less secure are water rights, such that there is greater 
uncertainty over the ability to access the flow of benefits and the smaller those gains, all else equal, 
the lower will be the willingness to pay.  
 
When markets are competitive, prices emerge from voluntary exchange between numerous buyers and 
sellers  for  homogeneous  water  (water  of  the  same  quality,  reliability).  These  prices  reveal  the   4 
marginal values of demanders and suppliers  (including the opportunity  cost of using water in its 
current use, such as irrigation, or selling to an alternative buyer), as well as conveyance costs and any 
regulatory restrictions that are incorporated into the supply price. When an exchange takes place, one 
can conclude that the buyer’s willingness to pay for water is greater than or equal to the exchange 
price; that there is no seller available to complete the transaction at a lower price at that time; and that 
the seller’s value foregone by completing the transaction is less than or equal to the transaction price. 
Differences  in  marginal  water  values  across  uses,  as  reflected  in  market  prices  (agriculture-to-
agriculture exchange prices as compared to agriculture-to-urban exchange prices), that are not due to 
conveyance or other costs, indicate that there are social gains from reallocating water from lower to 
higher-valued uses.  In the absence of conveyance or other transaction costs, the marginal net benefits 
of water should be equalized and it is possible to conclude that the allocation is Pareto efficient.  We 
use this notion to evaluate the performance of water institutions in the western US and the MDB.  
 
A water allocation is Pareto efficient if no user can be made better off with a reallocation without 
making any other user worse off.  Competitive, voluntary markets by definition are Pareto efficient, in 
the absence of third-party effects, and this result is known as the  First  Fundamental Theorem of 
Welfare Economics. If we identify the maximum willingness of the buyer to pay for the water, B, and 
subtract the opportunity cost of the seller, the maximum value of an alternative use, S, we have the net 
gain from trade, B-S.  If the price of the transaction were P, then B-P of the gain goes to the buyer, 
while P-S goes to the seller. This simple framework provides a useful method for demonstrating the 
potential gains from water trade in the western US and Australia, holding differences in water quality, 
conveyance, and possible impacts on third parties constant.  
   5 
In water markets, increased water scarcity is revealed by gradually rising equilibrium prices. That is, 
as demand grows for a fixed stock of water (due to new uses, higher incomes, and so forth), prices 
rise.  Similarly,  if  supply  declines  then  the  remaining  water  has  a  higher  marginal  value  forcing 
existing demanders either to pay more or to cut back consumption, equating their marginal values 
with the new higher supply price. For these reasons, rising water prices in real terms in competitive 
markets are indicators of increased scarcity. In this sense water scarcity is comparable to scarcity in 
other resources that can also be measured by a rising price [Brown and Field, 1978; Barnett and 
Morse, 1963].   
 
Water markets in both the MDB and US west are less than ideal, particularly due to third-party effects 
and high conveyance and regulatory costs that limit trades between prospective buyers and sellers. 
Markets, especially in the US are often very local and limited in number of trades, but as we show, 
this  is  gradually  changing.  Water  quality  differences  also  affect  water  values  and  prices.  In  our 
analysis, we assume water is of similar quality, although we often cannot directly control for quality 
in the data available to us. Similarly, regulatory costs limit trade although there may be legitimate 
reasons  for  regulating  water  exchanges  due  to  the  potential  for  negative  impacts  on  non-trading 
parties. The manner in which regulation takes place also influences its cost, and in our analysis of the 
institutional structures in the US and Australia, we compare regulatory arrangements that appear to 
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2.2. Other Methodological Issues  
2.2.1. Volumes of water traded  
 
The US data on water transactions include sales, long-term leases, and short-term (one year) leases. In 
the MDB prices are for annual volumes of water called seasonal allocations and for water rights, 
called water entitlements that provide the holder a share of the consumptive pool of water in a given 
catchment in perpetuity. Seasonal allocations in the MDB are comparable to a one year lease in the 
US west, which we term, annual flow. Prices for one year contracts present no problem in terms of 
comparisons, but multi-year leases and sales commit water long term and hence, the annual flow 
amount understates the volumes of water traded.  Accordingly, following the procedure outlined in 
Brewer et al. [2008, 99], for all multi-year contracts in the US we project the water quantities forward 
and discount back at 5% in a manner analogous to find the present value of a multi-year bond. We 
label this contracted amount, committed water.   
 
2.2.2. Calculating the gains from further market trades.   
To take advantage of the price data that we do have, we use the notion of Pareto dominance to derive 
a method for finding gains from trade with real-world data. Historically, most water has been used in 
agriculture  in  the  US  West  and  the  MDB.  There  are  active  markets  between  agricultural  users 
typically involving short-term trades.  Because the water does not leave the basin where it is sourced, 
conveyance costs are low and there are few third-party effects as unconsumed, released flows remain 
in the area. Water quality also is homogeneous. For these reasons, agriculture-to-agriculture transfers 
often occur routinely and do not require regulatory review.   
   7 
There is also an additional demand for water from growing urban populations in the US West, and 
agriculture-to-urban transfers are more complicated in terms of understanding the gains from trade. 
Water may leave the basin or watershed so that return flows are no longer available and, thereby, 
impose costs on third parties that would have otherwise use the return flows (third-party impairment). 
Accordingly, there are often regulatory reviews of proposed trades that add to transaction costs. These 
reviews may require that less water be traded or that compensation be paid to the parties that may be 
injured.  In  addition,  conveyance  costs  typically  are  greater  and  urban  demanders  require  higher 
quality and more secure water.  These factors add to the supply price of water, and will lead to a 
divergence  between  agricultural  and  urban  water  prices.    Any  reduction  in  these  costs  (lower 
conveyance charges, smoother regulatory processes) will allow more water to be transferred.     
 
Observed  differences  between  the  prices  of  agriculture-to-urban  transfers  and  agriculture-to-
agriculture transfers represent the maximum potential economic gains from trade.  We can estimate 
these gains by multiplying the price difference times an amount of water to be moved from one use to 
another after accounting for differences in supply and treatment costs.  If the amount of water in each 
transaction is small relative to overall consumption either in agriculture or in urban use, then marginal 
values will not change appreciably due to the transaction, and the exercise will indicate the potential 
benefits from trade.   
 
2.2.3. Water Rights in US West 
In the US West, most water is owned through appropriative water rights. The appropriative doctrine 
emerged in the 19th century in response to the development of mining and agriculture in the semi-arid 
West where growing numbers of people and economic activities were increasingly concentrated in   8 
areas where there was too little water [Kanazawa, 1998]. Prior appropriation allowed water to be 
separated from riparian land and moved via canals and ditches to new locations [Johnson et al., 1981]. 
 
Under prior appropriation, individuals do not own water as they might own land.  Each state owns the 
water,  which  it  holds  in  trust  for  its  citizens.  Instead,  individuals  hold  usufruct  rights  that  are 
capitalized into land values and that transfer with the land or that can sold, or leased separately from 
it.    This  attribute  is  the  basis  for  water  markets  and  security  for  investment  in  water-delivery 
infrastructure, agriculture, and other endeavors. 
 
Appropriative water rights grant possessory rights to a fixed quantity or flow, usually in cubic feet per 
second of water for diversion from a stream, based on the date of the original claim [Johnson et al., 
1981, 282; Smith, 2008, 452, 467-72]. These physical volumes assigned to holders of appropriative 
rights must be used ‘beneficially’ whether by the right holder or by those who purchase the water if it 
is traded. Entities with the earliest claims or senior rights have the highest priority and subsequent 
claimants  have  lower-priority  or  junior  rights.    Diversions  are  filled  by  rank  so  long  as  there  is 
sufficient stream flow. During drought, water is progressively rationed according to priority of the 
right, and junior diversions may be halted.   
 
Appropriative rights are conditional upon water being placed into beneficial use—the ‘use-it-or-lose-
it’ mandate─ and no injury to third parties. If not used beneficially, the right may lapse under the 
doctrine of abandonment.  Beneficial use is a low-cost way of determining if there is excess water to 
be appropriated. The driest western states ─ Arizona,  Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, 
and Wyoming recognize only appropriative water rights whereas, the wetter states of California, the 
Dakotas, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington recognize both riparian and   9 
appropriative institutions [Kanazawa, 1998].  Beneficial use, however, contributes to waste as rights 
holders devote water extensively to low marginal-value ‘approved’ applications in order to maintain 
ownership and neglect higher marginal-value uses that may not be considered consistent with the 
doctrine. It is this ‘marginal’ water devoted to low-value uses that is the basis for most potential water 
trades.   
 
2.2.4. Water Rights in Murray-Darling Basin 
In  Australia,  surface  statutory  water  rights  in  the  MDB  are  defined  in  terms  of  diversions  per 
irrigation season. Beginning first with the State of Victoria in 1886, states have transformed riparian 
water rights into statutory water rights [McKay, 2008] although vestiges of riparian rights still remain 
in the form water harvesting for ‘stock and domestic use’ that can neither be traded nor used for  other 
purposes.  
 
In  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  Australian  states  used  their  acquired  water  rights  to 
encourage farming settlements in the southern MDB with the free allocation of statutory water rights, 
typically one acre-foot [Martin, 2005], and the construction of water storage facilities and public 
irrigation works [Connell, 2007]. By the 1980s an over allocation of statutory water rights had led to 
increasing  pressure  for  water  rights  to  be  separated  from  land,  and  be  tradable  so  as  to  access 
increasingly scarce water. This led to the establishment of water markets for permanent water in the 
States of South Australia in 1982, New South Wales and Queensland in 1989, and Victoria in 1991 
[Murray-Darling Basin Commission, 1995: 37].  Further reforms to water trading and the register of 
water  entitlements  occurred  in  the  1990s  following  an  agreement  by  the  Council  of  Australian 
Governments  (CoAG)  in  1994  to  separate  all  statutory  surface  water  rights  from  land  rights 
[Bjornlund, 2003]. This reform greatly boosted water trade and this has been accelerated by further   10 
water  market  reforms  in  another  CoAG  agreement  in  2004  called  the  National  Water  Initiative. 
Among  other  commitments,  the  signatory  government  agreed  that  water  entitlements  should  be 
exclusive, divisible and tradable and also recorded in public water registers. State government also 
committed to the freeing up of the trade of water entitlements across state borders. 
 
The imposition of a fixed cap on surface water extractions Basin-wide, imposed since 1995, was 
coupled with an allocation of the nominal volumes of water entitlements in excess of the long-term 
surface  water  availability.  As  a  result,  although  the  cap  has  stopped  further  growth  in  water 
extractions Basin-wide it also triggered the activation of previously unused water licences, called 
‘sleeper’ licences, or rarely used water licences, called ‘dozer’ licences. The activation of sleepers and 
dozers  reduced  the  overall  level  of  reliability  of  entitlements  when  these  rights  were  activated 
[Quiggin, 2008] to the loss of those who held and actively used water licences.  
 
Statutory water rights in the MDB are called water entitlements. They provide the owner with a share 
of a consumptive pool, but the actual quantities of water that holders of entitlements are permitted to 
divert depend on the seasonal allocation that is assigned each year to the water entitlement.  The 
seasonal allocation represents an actual volume of water that can be diverted in a given irrigation 
season. The seasonal allocation, unlike the nominal quantity of the water entitlement is not fixed, but 
depends on the water entitlement’s level of reliability that determines the preferential access to the 
consumptive pool, the overall limit on diversions in the Basin that are set by catchment, expected 
inflows into the system, and water storage levels. The higher the reliability of the water entitlements 
the greater would be the expected frequency of years when the seasonal allocation equals nominal 
volume  registered  on  the  water  entitlement.  In  periods  of  above  normal  inflows  and  high  water 
storage levels, the seasonal allocation should equal the nominal amount on the water entitlement.   11 
However, in periods of low inflows or drought the seasonal allocation, at least for low reliability 
water entitlements, can be much less than the nominal amount on the water entitlement, and possibly 
even zero.  
 
3. Water Markets in the US West and the Murray Darling Basin:  Current Patterns of Water 
Trading  
Notable  reviews  of  water  trading  include:  Easter,  Rosegrant  and  Dinar  [1998;  1999],  Howe, 
Schurmeier and Shaw [1986], Rosegrant and Binswanger [1994], Saleth and Dinar [2000], among 
others. These studies focus on the benefits of water markets and provide guidance as to how they may 
be improved, typically from an economic efficiency perspective. Our goal is to detail the origins, 
constraints and outcomes of two of the world’s largest water markets. We show how water markets 
can, and do, function in very different legal and institutional frameworks, and what this implies in 
terms  of  efficiency.  Prior  to  making  comparisons  across  the  two  water  markets  we  provide  an 
overview of current water market activity beginning with the US west. 
 
3.1. The Nature of Water Trading in the US West 
All western states allow for water trades, but water markets in the U.S. are generally local, within a 
water  basin  and  within  a  state  due  to  differential  regulations,  institutions,  and  conveyance 
opportunities. There are three types of transfers—permanent sales of water rights, short-term leases (1 
year), and longer-term leases (up to 35 years or more). Among these, there are transfers among those 
who use the water for the same purpose—irrigated agriculture for example, or among those with 
different purposes—agriculture-to-urban or environmental, and transfers within a water basin—where 
sources are interrelated geologically, or across basins—out of one water region to another. Short-term 
leases within a basin among those who use water for the same purpose, such as farmers, typically   12 
have been the most common. Longer-term leases and sales of water rights often involve changes in 
the location and nature of use of water. 
 
Given that water markets are, typically, confined and because there are no central registries of trades, 
it is difficult to determine the overall extent of water marketing in the western US. Our data are 
interpreted  from  transactions  listed  in  the  Water  Strategist.  The  data  are  aggregated  from  4,220 
observations  from  1987  through  2008  for  12  western  states  as  compiled  from  water  transactions 
described  in  the  trade  journal  (the  data  is  available  at 
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm). The Water Strategist is a monthly publication 
that details water transactions, litigation, legislation, and other water marketing activities.  The journal 
publishes each month a ‘Transactions’ section that lists, by state, various water transfers that typically 
include the year of the transfer; the acquirer and supplier of the water (both labelled variously as 
municipality, developer, company, irrigator, farmer, rancher, conservancy district, irrigation district, 
state, federal agency, etc.); the amount of water transferred; the proposed use of the water; and, if 
applicable, the terms, such as the price and nature (lease or sale) of the contract.  In developing the 
dataset, we often have to interpret entries in the Water Strategist where the discussion is unclear as to 
the  nature  of  the  trade  (our  methodology  is  described  at: 
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm). The data only include transactions reported by 
the  Water  Strategist,  and  hence,  is  not  conclusive  because  transactions  are  likely  to  be  missed, 
especially those that take place within organizations, such as irrigation districts. Nevertheless, the 
entries  are  among  the  most  comprehensive  available  across  states,  and  hence,  likely  capture  the 
general pattern of water trading.  
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Figure 1a illustrates the yearly path of transfer volumes in the 12 western states from 1987 through 
2008  by  the  type  of  contract  used:  sales  of  water  rights;  one-year  leases;  and  multi-year  leases. 
Although one-year leases of water rights appear to have been the most active type of trade in terms of 
per-year volume, this is misleading.  As discussed previously, sales commit water permanently to a 
new  user.  Therefore,  a  sale  of  water  in  a  given  year  actually  commits  that  quantity  of  water  in 
perpetuity. Figure 1b shows the total committed water transferred each year by contract type.    
 
Figure 2 shows the price differential between one-year leases and permanent sales in dollars per 
committed ML (one ML = one million liters) in 11 western states excluding Colorado. Colorado is 
excluded  because  the  large  number  of  high-price,  low-volume  sales  in  the  state  overwhelms  the 
general trends in median prices in other states. The patterns in the figure indicate that although the 
committed  measure  compares  one-year  lease  prices  with  the  value  of  a  one-year  supply  of 
permanently traded water, in recent years there has been premium paid for permanent rights.  This is 
not an historic rule, however, as seen during the significant drought that hit the Western US in 1987-
1992.  In this time period, it was not uncommon for one-year lease prices to exceed the committed 
price of permanent transfers as parties sought additional short-term water sources. 
 
Transactions vary substantially across the states reflecting differences in water supply and demand, as 
well as differences in property rights and regulatory institutions.  Colorado dominates in terms of total 
quantity  of  market  transactions,  where  most  are  sales.  Sales  as  a  share  of  transactions  also  are 
important in the most arid states of Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah. Short-term leases (1-
year) are most common in California and Texas. Sales and long-term leases are limited in California, 
for example, by county ordinances that prohibit exports of water, and irrigation district bylaws that 
limit out-of-district trades.      14 
3.2. The Nature of Water Trading in Murray-Darling Basin 
Water trade in the Murray-Darling Basin accounts for about 60% of all entitlement trade and over 
80% of seasonal allocation trade in Australia. By volume, over 12% of all water entitlements were 
traded in 2008-09 [National water Commission, 2009, p.5] while about 20% of seasonal allocations 
were traded over the same period [National water Commission, 2010, p.21]. For the period 2008-09 
total water entitlement trade was over 1,000 GL (one GL = one thousand million liters) in nominal 
volumes of water while seasonal allocation trade totaled some 1,700 GL. The total value of turnover 
in entitlement trade was about $2 billion and in terms of seasonal allocations about $500 million in 
2008-09 (all prices are given in US dollars while Australian dollars are converted at par because as of 
November 2010 1$US = $1Aus). 
 
After seasonal allocation trade was permitted in the 1980s, the MDB water market expanded greatly. 
Substantial  increases  in  trade  occurred  in  the  1990s  coincident  with  the  freeing  up  of  the  water 
entitlement trade, and again in the past five years as a consequence of the drought. Figure 3 shows the 
growth in the water traded by volume for water entitlements and seasonal allocations over the past 25 
years. The trade in terms of volumes for seasonal allocations has typically been much greater than 
water entitlements, but water entitlement trade has expanded at a faster rate in the recent drought as 
irrigators have sought to readjust their portfolios of entitlements in terms of their reliability.  
 
The millennium drought that lasted about a decade and that ended in 2010 fostered greater trading 
because of the dramatically reduced seasonal allocations of water. The drought led to zero opening 
seasonal allocations to many low reliability water entitlements in the recent past, and historically low 
allocations to high reliability water entitlements at the start of the irrigation season. To make up the 
shortfall those irrigators with high marginal values of water entered the water market to secure water   15 
that,  in  the  past,  they  would  have  received  as  seasonal  allocations  assigned  to  their  own  water 
entitlements. As a result, the volume of water trade increased by close to half, in terms of volume, 
from  2004-5  to  2007-08  and  increased  by  75%  for  entitlement  trade  and  by  40%  for  seasonal 
allocation trade between 2007-08 and 2008-09.  
 
Beneficiaries of water trading in the MDB include, but are not limited to, perennial-crop farmers who 
irrigate  orchards  and  vineyards  and  who,  despite  having  high-reliability  water  entitlements,  have 
found that their assigned seasonal allocations were less than they expected and required. Without the 
ability to purchase seasonal allocation water during the worst years of the millennium drought, many 
of their vineyards and orchards would have suffered major harm or died. Sellers of seasonal water 
have also benefited as the increased volume of sales, at high water prices, provided an important 
source of income that has helped offset reduced irrigation and associated crop production.   
 
Market prices have responded to changes in supply and demand. For example, the severest years of 
the drought from 2006-2008 coincided with a peak in seasonal allocation prices, as shown in Figure 4.  
Higher  prices  have  encouraged  investments  in  on-farm  water  efficiency  and  have  contributed  to 
annual productivity improvements of about 3% per year over the past two decades [Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2008]. The ability to trade and to adjust the volume and mix of high and low reliability 
water entitlements to reduce risks of insufficient water supplies has also permitted investments in 
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4. Potential for Additional Water Trades   
4.1. Price Differentials in the US West 
Water price differentials across different uses can signal the opportunity for beneficial exchange. In 
the US case, price comparisons are difficult to assemble because most water markets are local with 
limited  comparable  observations  of  trades  within  and  across  sectors.  Accordingly,  examining 
available price data must be done with caution, but the patterns are indicative of the benefits from 
further water re-allocation.  
   
Data assembled by Clay Landry and reported in Libecap [2010a, 2010b] for two regional markets, the 
Reno/Truckee  Basin,  Nevada  and  the  South  Platte  Basin,  Colorado,  show  significant  price  gaps 
between agriculture-to-urban and agricultural-to-agriculture transactions. For the Truckee Basin, the 
median price of 1,025 agriculture-to-urban water sales between 2002 and 2009 (2008 dollars) was 
$17,685/acre foot (an acre foot = 1,233.482 Cu. M. or 1.233482 million liters) or some $14,337/ML, 
whereas for 13 agriculture-to-agriculture sales over the same period the median price was $1,216/ML. 
For the South Platte, the median price for 138 agriculture-to-urban sales between 2002 and 2008 was 
$5,285/ML as compared to $4,304/ML for 110 agriculture-to-agriculture sales. Note that the above 
prices are given per yearly flow volume. 
   
Aggregating transactions across markets and time can compensate for limited comparable transactions 
within  markets  in  order  to  gain  a  better  sense  of  differences  in  value  across  uses.  Of  the  4,220 
transactions in our data set with information on the transacting parties, amounts, and nature of use, a 
smaller number, 2,765, had price data.   Median prices across 12 western states between 1987 and 
2008 are presented in Table 1 for leases and sales for agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-
urban transactions. These prices are given per volume of committed flow, so that a comparison can be   17 
made between one-year leases and permanent sales.
 The annual mean and median sale and lease 
prices for agriculture-to-urban transactions are significantly higher than are agriculture-to-agriculture 
trades. This condition in part indicates the benefits of out-of-sector water transfers. If these price 
differentials are in excess of the differences in transactions costs, such as those due to regulatory 
review  and  conveyance  costs,  transfers  from  irrigators  to  urban  users  should  result  in  a  Pareto 
dominant allocation.   
 
4.2. Water Price Differentials in the MDB 
During the millennium drought the price differentials between urban and rural water users was much 
less that in the western US. This is because markets are more active spatially across catchments in the 
MDB, at least in the southern part of the Basin. The market price for seasonal allocations of water 
varies by catchment and over an irrigation season, but range from $100 to $500/ML, although much 
lower prices have been recorded ($7/ML), and also much higher (up to $1,200/ML) during record low 
inflows in 2006-2007. By contrast, urban water consumers living in or near the MDB pay, depending 
on  the  city  or  town  and  their  household  consumption,  between  $1,100  and  over  $3,000/ML  for 
potable water and Australia wide paid on average $1,930/ML for urban water in 2008-09 [Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2010, p. 44). Given the substantial costs involved in disinfecting and conveying 
potable  water  to  consumers  24  hours  per  day,  365  days  per  year  there  was  essentially  no  price 
differential between urban water consumers and irrigators at the bottom end of the prices charged to 
urban households during the recent drought. However, in periods of normal flows there is a basis for 
further trade because, even with pumping and water treatment, the price in urban communities is 
much higher than in rural water markets.  
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To date there have been relatively few rural-urban water trades [Quiggin, 2006]. South Australia 
purchased 18 GL of water entitlements in 2005 to provide additional urban water supplies [South 
Australia Water, 2006]. The State of Victoria has spent over $700 million to construct pipelines from 
its northern catchments to pipe over 100 GL/year of water to towns and cities in the South. The 
Australian Capital Territory government, and its private-sector partner, is building a pipeline to pump 
water from the Murrumbidgee River, one of the largest tributaries to the Murray River, to a storage 
facility. After the pipeline is built, the plan is to access rural water by purchasing water entitlements to 
provide an additional source of supply of up to 20 GL/year.  
 
5. Estimates of the Welfare Gains from Further Water Transfers 
5.1. Gains from Greater Market Trading in the Western US 
Given the observed differences in water values between agriculture and urban applications, we can 
estimate what the welfare gain might be under varying scenarios of a hypothetical increase in water 
trading from the agriculture to urban sector. In 2009 the US Geological Survey (USGS) published 
water diversions by state for 2005 [Kenny et. al., 2009]. Using those measures as indications of long-
term water diversions and the annual trading data from the Water Strategist, it is possible to present 
those trades as a share of the USGS 2005 data. The most rural states, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, 
have markets which annually trade, in committed acre-feet, less than 3% of their total freshwater 
withdrawals  (excluding  thermoelectric  withdrawals).  For  the  key  states  of  Arizona,  California, 
Colorado, Nevada, and Texas, trades of committed water annually range between 5% and 15% of 
total state freshwater diversions. Data from Water Strategist indicate that over $4.3 billion (2008 $) 
was spent or committed by urban buyers between 1987 and 2008, with nearly $4.18 billion spent by 
urban buyers in the five key states indicated above.   
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Price differentials indicate possible welfare gains from increased urban acquisitions.  For example, if 
we examine the five states mentioned above the potential gains from moving water from agriculture 
may be significant. We assume that the benefit to urban buyers of the additional water remains at the 
prevailing agriculture-to-urban market price. (The net gain is this value, less the opportunity cost of 
water  in  agriculture  as  approximated  by  the  agriculture-to-agriculture  price.)  Table  2  reports  the 
yearly welfare benefit of transferring 5% of the water currently used for irrigation to urban users at the 
median historical prices for both sectors. These values provide estimates, for the first time, of the 
relative social gains from moving some water from agriculture to urban use. Because this exercise 
proposes transferring a relatively small amount of irrigation water, it minimizes the potential impact 
on water prices in agriculture and urban areas.  
 
The  nature  of  available  water  price data  dictates the  broad  approach  used  here  in  estimating  the 
returns to greater water transfers. The revealed gains can be interpreted as the potential benefits from 
further water transfers. In the five key states, water trades captured by the dataset total more than $190 
million per year. In Colorado, high conveyance costs in moving water from the west slope of the 
Rocky Mountains to the east where the urban population is located leads to an overly optimistic 
estimate  of  gain.    Nevertheless,  our  estimate  excluding  Colorado  indicates  a  yearly  $56  million 
welfare gain (over $1.1 billion in perpetuity, at a 5% discount rate). Arizona, which has a centralized 
population  and  sufficient  transportation  infrastructure  in  place,  already  trades  more  water  as  a 
percentage of total volume extracted of any western state.  It, therefore, has more modest gains from 
increased transfers by our methodology, but there still exist significant price differences at the margin.  
 
5.2. Gains from greater water trading in Australia:    20 
Peterson et al. [2004] use a computable general equilibrium model to estimate the benefits of water 
trade in the MDB. The gains from trade within catchments and across states are greatest in years of 
below normal inflows, and are worth approximately $700 million ($2008) while in a year with above 
normal inflows the gains are estimated at $300 million ($2008).  This approach, and that applied to 
valuing water-trading in the MDB below, differs from the approach used above with the US data.  
Because  the  MDB  is  a  single  basin,  it  is  possible  to  approximate  the  full-equilibrium  affects  of 
complete water trading.  In the US dataset, each state’s data encompasses several basins.  Although 
some inter-basin trading does take place, valuing potential  gains using  a free trade  model would 
dramatically overestimate the capacity of infrastructure from the basins where water is sourced to 
cope with water removal.  Thus, the partial-equilibrium model we employ in the US West based on  
marginal  transfers  better  accounts  for  the  limited  nature  of  potential  inter-basin  transfers  in  that 
region. 
 
The most up-to-date and comprehensive review of water trading in the southern MDB was completed 
by  the  National  Water  Commission  [2010]  in  June  2010.  Its  key  findings  include:  water  trading 
increased the gross domestic product of Australia by some $220 million in 2008-09; it raised the gross 
regional product of the southern MDB by some $370 million; the gains from trade by state were New 
South Wales ($79 million), South Australia ($16 million) and Victoria ($271 million). The report  
concludes that, overall, trading between irrigators had a positive effect on the environment during the 
recent drought because it increased downstream flows that benefitted river systems while trading  had 
no discernible impact on the timing  of flows.  
 
There are also likely to be dynamic gains from trade associated with price-induced innovation in 
farming practices. Such benefits are difficult to quantify, but combined with the static gains from   21 
trade help explain why, when there was a 70% reduction in surface water use by irrigators from 2000-
01  to  2007-08,  the  nominal  gross  value  of  irrigated  agriculture  fell  by  less  than  1%  [Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2010]. 
 
6. Water Institutions  
6.1. US Water Institutions:  Appropriative Water Rights 
Appropriative water rights allow water to be separated from the land provided it has a beneficial use 
and,  as  such,  provide  a  basis  for  water  trades  and  water  markets  across  users  and  sectors. 
Additionally,  when  water  rights  have  been  secure  enough,  they  have  promoted  private  and 
government  investment  in  a  reliable  water  supply  and  delivery  infrastructure  that  has  expanded 
agriculture and urban development in the semi-arid American West [Hansen et al. 2010, Libecap, 
2010a]. All of this has been in general, positive but there are also issues of concern.  
 
Under prior appropriation there is a critical interdependence among diverters from the same water 
source with different priority rights. As much as 50% of senior diversion is not consumed by plants or 
evaporation,  and  flows  back  to  the  stream  or  percolates  down  to  the  aquifer  to  be  available  for 
subsequent users [Young, 1986, 1144]. During times of drought when only senior appropriators may 
have their allotments fulfilled, junior appropriators, who bear most of the downside risk of drought, 
are  especially dependent upon these return flows. Actions by senior rights holders to change the 
location, nature, or timing of use can affect water consumption and, thereby, influence the amount of 
water released downstream.
  Accordingly, water trading from agriculture to urban uses that involves 
export out  of the  basin and  reduces  return  flows,  can  impair third  parties  and  is  subject  to  state 
regulation to insure that no damage is inflicted on junior diverters [Getches, 1997, 161].  
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Applications for transferring rights are filed with the relevant state regulatory agency for approval.  
The applicant specifies the location and amount of water, the duration of the contract, the timing of 
the exchange, type of water right involved, consumptive use, and possibly hydraulic and other legal 
information. Objections can be lodged, and the burden of proof of non-impairment rests with the 
applicant.  The regulatory process and the costs associated with it vary across states, in part because 
the ‘no harm’ mandate is defined differently [Colby et al., 1989; Colby, 1990; MacDonnell, 1990,; 
Thompson, 1993, 704-5].  
    
By  assigning  ownership  to  specified  amounts  or  flows  of  a  highly  variable  resource  stock, 
appropriative water rights exacerbate third-party effects occasioned by trades initiated by senior rights 
holders. The potential for third-party impairment raises the likelihood of protests and litigation by 
junior rights holders over water trades. Conflicts over claims of third-party impairment can be an 
important barrier to trade by raising transactions costs.   
   
Until the latter part of the 20
th century, third-party impairment generally was not an issue because 
most traded water stayed within the local agricultural community where demand was concentrated. In 
the face of contemporary pressures to re-allocate water to other uses, however, protests of harm can 
be significant barriers to trade. The standard of ‘harm’, however, can be so vague and the range of 
standing so broad for parties to challenge proposed exchanges that they can become mired in costly 
disputes and delay.
 This situation tends to keep water locked in agriculture even though there are 
higher marginal values elsewhere. 
   
Rural communities often resist water trades to urban areas because of concerns about reductions in 
demand for agricultural labor and farm equipment and, hence, overall economic conditions.  Indeed,   23 
as of 2002, 22 of 58 California counties had implemented ordinances to limit surface water transfers if 
they appear to diminish groundwater resources.  Although identifying a legitimate concern, the major 
intent  of  these  laws  is  to  keep  water  within  rural  counties  and  limit  reallocation  to  urban  or 
environmental uses [Hanak, 2003, vii, viii; Hanak and Dyckman, 2003].   Additionally, the California 
State Water Resources Control Board also can deny a proposed water transfer if would “unreasonably 
affect the overall economy of the area from which the water is being transferred.”[CA Water Code § 
386]. 
   
Given that most water transferred from agriculture comes from marginal low-valued uses, the 
estimated broader pecuniary effects appear to be small.  Research [Hanak, 2003, x-xii, 72, 81; Howitt, 
1994] indicates that the effects of fallowing irrigated farmland are likely to have no more than a one 
percent effect on overall county economic activity, even when payments for economic adjustments 
are not included. Further, other research [Libecap, 2007, 2009] shows that in the case of the famous 
water transfer between Owens Valley farmers and Los Angeles, often pointed to as an example of the 
negative consequences of agriculture-to-urban exchanges, the alleged negative consequences did not 
take place.  The added water supply delivered via the Los Angeles Aqueduct made the rapid growth 
of Los Angeles possible, and analysis of the prices paid by the city for water rights and land reveals 
that farmers did much better financially than if they had stayed in agriculture. Moreover, those who 
joined bargaining pools received significantly higher prices.  
 
Despite all of this, concerns about pecuniary and technological third-party impairment from water 
trades generate regulatory and political opposition to greater market activity under the appropriative 
rights system. If instead, water rights were granted as portions or shares of the annual total allowable 
withdrawal from a water basin, adjustable according to precipitation, then all appropriators would   24 
share in any adjustments in total diversions due to precipitation shortfalls.  Under this setting ‘junior’ 
parties would not be differentially impacted by drought or be  as dependent upon released flows. 
Hence,  the  potential  for  at  least  technological  third-party  harm  from  trades  would  be  reduced, 
especially if they are limited to consumptive use [Burness and Quirk, 1980, 124; Johnson et al., 1981, 
274].  
 
In the Colorado Big Thompson Project (CBT) in northern Colorado, property rights are assigned via 
water shares rather than fixed quantities. The water is allocated through tradable uniform water units, 
whereby each is a share of the annual amount of water available to the District. The water in each unit 
fluctuates annually based on water supply, and all shares are adjusted in the same manner. Because 
shares are homogenous, transfers across users, especially across sectors, occur with minimal fees and 
paperwork [Thompson, 1993, 719; Carey and Sunding, 2001, 305; Howe and Goemans, 2003, 1058-
9].  Additionally, the Northern Colorado Conservancy District administers proposed trades rather than 
the  larger  and  more  politically  and  institutionally  complex  Bureau  of  Reclamation  (BOR).    As 
imported water from another basin, all return flows are owned by the District and cannot be claimed 
separately by other parties. This provision reduces conflicts over potential third-party impairment in 
water trades. For these reasons, the Colorado Big Thompson is by far the most active water market in 
the West in terms of numbers of trades, and sales prices for all uses are comparable.  For example, 
sample agriculture-to-urban and agriculture-to-agriculture sales were priced at $9,350 and $9,300/unit 
respectively, as reported in the October 2008 Water Strategist, p. 7. 
 
Given the long-standing nature of appropriative water rights in the US West, it seems unlikely that 
they would be broadly replaced by water shares. The distributional issues and uncertainties associated 
with such re-allocation would be too large. Nevertheless, there is innovation in rights structures in   25 
some  areas,  such  as  those  described  by  Richards  [2008]  in  New  Mexico.  In  five  severely  over-
allocated  and  important  water  basins  in  New  Mexico,  appropriative  rights  have  been  voluntarily 
modified to protect high marginal value junior rights holders and to stop excessive withdrawals in the 
face of growing demand and highly-variable supplies.  
 
6.2. US Water Institutions: Irrigation Districts 
Water supply networks require initial fixed investments in dams, reservoirs, canals, and feeder ditches 
to capture, store, and deliver water.  A variety of water supply organizations have developed in the US 
West [Libecap, 2010a]. Among the most important are irrigation districts.  They also pose important 
implications for contemporary water markets.   
 
Irrigation districts covered 4% of irrigated acreage in the West in 1910 and nearly 25% by 1978 
[Bretsen and Hill, 2006, 293, 312-27]. Many districts, however, have rights to very large amounts of 
water.  One of the country’s largest irrigation districts, the Imperial Irrigation District of Southern 
California, annually diverts 3,450 GL of Colorado River water, nearly two-thirds of California’s legal 
share of the river. The district includes 495,000 acres of cropland as well as urban areas.  
 
Irrigation districts vary across the western states. In general they are political subdivisions and have 
eminent domain powers to avoid hold-up in laying the network; ability to tax all lands within the 
district to cover expenses; power to coerce membership in the district once the required majority of 
voters agree; and authority to issue tax-exempt bonds for construction, backed by assessments against 
the land within the district. Districts are launched by petitions to county commissioners from land 
owners seeking to construct an irrigation network. Their irrigation plan is reviewed and subject to   26 
vote.  The  nature  of  the  franchise  and  required  approval  majorities  varies  among  the  states  with 
important long-term ramifications for water rights and governance of irrigation districts.   
 
In many states, only land owners within the proposed district vote and comprise the governing board. 
These organizations may be called private irrigation districts. By contrast, in California, Idaho, and 
Kansas as a trade-off for receiving governmental powers, all registered voters are eligible to select the 
governing  board.  A  wide  franchise  grants  decision  making  over  water  rights,  allocation,  and 
management to a diverse group of interests, ranging from land owners, tenants, agricultural equipment 
sellers, farm labor, school district officials, and so forth.  Given such heterogeneity, interests are 
difficult to merge and water trades complex [Thompson, 1993, 678, 728, 740; Rosen and Sexton, 
1993, 40-1, 49-52; Bretsen and Hill, 2006, 320-23; 2009, 737]. These may be called public irrigation 
districts.  
 
Concern about possible third-party effects resulting from reduced demand for agricultural labor or 
farm  machinery  following  a  switch  to less  water-intensive  crops  or  fallowing  land  are important 
factors in community opposition to water trades.  As marginal water values outside of agriculture 
have become much higher than those within it, long-term transfers increasingly are to out-of-district 
users. Potential revenues to water sellers, especially, are large for districts near urban areas or with 
conveyance to them. For example, Robert Glennon reports [2002, 207] that land developers near the 
Grand Canyon National Park offered more than $16,000/ML in 2001 for Colorado River water used 
by farmers in the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) who paid about $11.00/ML.  
 
In light of the high prices offered for urban water there is potential for opportunism as additional 
claimants attempt to secure a portion of the rents.  Resolving the many disputes that can arise in the   27 
presence of large numbers of varied parties can be especially difficult and hence, delay, reduce, or 
block water trades.  
 
The implications of irrigation district structures for water trading are illustrated by the comparative 
experiences of two California districts, the public IID and the nearby private Palo Verde Irrigation 
District  (PVID),  where  only  landowners  determine  board  membership  and  policies  [Rosen  and 
Sexton, 1993, 43-51; Haddad, 2000, 74-92; Glennon, 2009, 258-71; Bretsen and Hill, 2009, 756-60].   
 
Negotiations between the IID governing board and officials of the Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California (MWD) and the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) for long-term 
water leases occurred between 1984 and 2003. Only after the intervention of the U.S. Department of 
the Interior that administers Colorado River water, and that supported a re-allocation of IID water, 
was an agreement finally concluded in 2003 to transfer over 3,700 GL to urban users over 75 years. 
 
Negotiations between the PVID governing board and the MWD, by contrast, were much smoother, 
faster, and less contentious.  The PVID also is a large district, irrigating 131,298 acres with 555,067 
ML of water diverted annually from the Colorado River. One set of negotiations over water began in 
1986 and were successfully concluded in 1992.  Another started in 2002 with agreement in 2004. 
Both involved dry-year options, whereby farmers were to fallow designated land when requested by 
the MWD and to release the water to the agency for urban delivery [Haddad, 2000, 95-115]. 
 
As  with  appropriative  water  rights,  it  is  unlikely  that  public  irrigation  districts  will  be  replaced, 
although decision making could be streamlined to promote water markets. The key problem presented 
by public irrigation districts is that they  ‘dilute’ decision-making over  water use and distribution   28 
among  a  large  number  of  diverse  interests,  and  hence,  raise  the  costs  of  exchange.    Their 
arrangements are important reasons why in some states like California contemporary water markets 
remain local and largely directed toward trade among irrigators, despite apparent high marginal values 
outside of agriculture.  
 
6.3. Trade Restrictions in the Murray-Darling Basin 
Almost all of the water entitlements trade occurs within each state in the MDB and there is negligible 
trade across states.  While most of the gains from trade  appear to come from intra-regional trade 
[Qureshi et al. 2009], restrictions across regions and states reduce the potential benefits of water 
markets. One of the more important barriers is the so-called 4% rule that was agreed to by state 
governments as part of the 2004 National Water Initiative, but as temporary measure to help manage 
regional  adjustments  from  water  traded  out  of  irrigation  districts.  This  rule  limits  out-of-district 
entitlement trade per year to 4% of the nominal volumes of entitlements in the irrigation district. At 
the end of 2010, only the state of Victoria has established a legally binding 4% rule and it has been a 
major  barrier  to  inter-state  trade  of  water  entitlements  from  out  of  Victoria.    The  Victorian 
government  has  agreed  to  begin  phasing  out  the  rule  beginning  July  2011  [National  Water 
Commission, 2010 p. 2], although it remains to be seen whether this commitment will be fulfilled. In 
any case, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2010, 89-109] has also ruled that the 
4% rule must be completely removed by 1 July 2014. 
 
Other  transaction  costs  in  completing  trades  across  states  entitlement  also  have  imposed  implicit 
barriers such that there was negligible water entitlement trade over the period 2007-2009 [National 
Water Commission, 2009]. Since 2006 inter-state water entitlements have been ‘tagged’ such that the 
characteristics from the source catchment, in particular the reliability, are retained when used at the   29 
destination catchment. At the very least, this complicates the portfolio management of entitlements 
and the delivery of seasonal allocations at appropriate times during the growing season.  
 
A further, implicit constraint on trade is between rural and urban uses. While in many places in the 
MDB  such  trades  could  take  place  between  urban  water  authorities  and  rural  water  entitlement 
holders, such trades have been the exception rather than the norm. This may seem puzzling given the 
decision to invest multi-billions on desalination plants in cities that can access water from the Basin, 
such as Adelaide and Melbourne with existing infrastructure. The barrier to rural-urban trade is that 
urban water authorities are state-owned and voluntary sales of water from rural areas are opposed 
politically in some rural communities. This is because rural communities are concerned that water 
removed  from  their  irrigation  district  increases  the  fixed  costs  of  supplying  water  to  remaining 
irrigators and may decrease economic activity, and reduce employment. This fear is, to some extent, 
justified as economic modeling indicates that rural-urban water trade could reduce gross regional 
product in irrigation areas from where the water is traded out [Dwyer et al., 2005]. These concerns 
have  discouraged  state  politicians,  and  thus  urban  water  authorities  that  are  answerable  to  state 
ministers,  from  pursuing  substantial  rural  water  purchases.  The  one  exception  has  been  the 
construction of a pipeline from the Murray-Darling Basin to provide up to 75GL/year of water to 
Melbourne. As of November 2010, the pipeline has been constructed, but because of concerns of 
communities from where the water is sourced, the newly elected Premier of Victoria, Ted Baillieu, 
has publicly stated that the pipeline will be permanently shut down and will not transfer water to 
Melbourne [Baillieu, 2010]. 
 
Another restriction on trade is the imposition of termination fees of irrigators who wish to sell their 
water entitlements and exit a defined irrigation infrastructure system. The termination fees are, by   30 
federal law, currently no more than ten times the annual access fee. These access fees  are fixed 
charges payable by each irrigator who has water delivered by the infrastructure operator. Termination 
fees in 2009-2010 in the main irrigation districts of the MDB ranged from about 8% to as much as 
27% of the water entitlement sales price. These fees are an impediment to trade, and to the extent that 
the  initial  fixed  costs  in  establishing  irrigation  infrastructure  have  already  been  amortized  or 
subsidized by taxpayers, [Musgrave, 2008] are not economically efficient [Productivity Commission, 
2010].  
 
A related issue in terms of trade and risk management is carryover rights of seasonal allocations from 
one irrigation season to the next. Carryover rights have been in place since the 1990s and have been 
widely used in Queensland and New South Wales and introduced more recently in South Australia 
and Victoria. Carryover rights differ by state and allow holders of water entitlements to carryover 
unused seasonal allocations. During times of drought they provide irrigators with the opportunity to 
manage inter-temporal risk [Hughes and Goesch, 2009].  To the extent that carryover rights differ by 
state this may disadvantage irrigators where carryover rules are more restrictive, especially where 
there inter-state barriers to the trade of water entitlements. For instance, as of 30 June 2011, seasonal 
allocation  carryover  from  previous  years  for  South  Australian  water  entitlement  holders  will  be 
discontinued that will place them at a disadvantage relative Victorian or New South Wales irrigators.  
 
6.4. Overuse and overallocation of surface water in the Murray-Darling Basin 
A fundamental problem in the MDB is the over allocation of water entitlements such that surface 
water entitlements exceed the amount available for diversions. This arose from a massive expansion 
in irrigation post World War II, primarily in the Southern MDB, that coincided with a period of high 
inflows. For instance, average surface water availability over the period 1951-2000 was over 17,000   31 
GL/year, despite substantial year-to-year fluctuations. By contrast, water availability was about 50 per 
cent less over the period 1900-1950 and was less than a third of this amount over the period 2001-
2007 [Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists, 2010]. As a result, an independent audit of the 
Basin, the Sustainable Rivers Audit released in 2008 rated the health of 23 river valleys in the MDB. 
The 2008 audit found that 20 out of 23 river valleys were in very poor (13) or poor (7) health [Davies 
et al., 2008]. These environmental outcomes are related to the level of extractions as proportion of 
pre-development flow. For instance, CSIRO [2008] calculates that the relative level of surface water 
use in the MDB is ‘extremely high’ and will get worse based on median climate change projections to 
2030 under current water planning arrangements. 
 
Although  Australian  state  governments  have  the  legal  authority  to  appropriate  water  entitlements 
without compensation, governments have eschewed this option because of the impact on irrigators 
and  their  communities.  Instead,  beginning  in  2004,  Australian  governments  have  undertaken 
buybacks  of  water  entitlements  and  subsidized  investments  in  water  efficiency  improvements. 
Initially, the goal was to recover 500 GL of water for environmental purposes. This program was 
greatly expanded in 2007 and updated in 2008 with funding from the Australian government that 
includes planned spending until 2018 of $3.1 billion for the purchase of water entitlements [Burke 
2010], and up to about $5.8 billion to promote efficiency and productivity of water use in irrigation 
[Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities,  2010a].  
 
The  planned  buyback  of  water  entitlements  and  irrigation  infrastructure  subsidies  have  been  
accompanied  by  a  basin-wide  planning  process  that  led  to  the  release  in  October  2010  of  guide 
documents to a proposed Basin plan due to be released in 2011. This Basin Plan is a legislative 
requirement under the Water Act 2007 that tries to give effect to the object “… to ensure the return to   32 
environmentally  sustainable  levels  of  extraction  for  water  resources  that  are  overallocated  or 
overused”  (Water  Act  Section  3,  paragraph  (d)).  The  consultative  documents  recommend  that 
environmental flows should be increased between 3,000GL/year and 4,000GL/year [Murray-Darling 
Basin Authority, 2010, xxi]. These volumes are specified as long-term averages such that in periods of 
sustained low inflows the volumes allocated to the environment would be less than average, while in 
period of sustained above-normal flows the volumes allocated to the environment would be greater. 
Given that the proposed environmental volumes in most catchments within the MDB exceed current 
environmental flows, based on terms of long-term averages, there will need to be a reduction in water 
interceptions and/or extractions from water courses in most parts of the Basin.  
 
As of 30 October 2010 the Australian government had holdings of water entitlements equivalent to 
806  GL  in  registered  water  entitlements  [Department  of  Sustainability,  Environment,  Water, 
Population and Communities, 2010b] and had delivered over 200 GL in environmental flows form 
these holdings.  To bridge the expected gap between desired and current extractions by irrigators in 
the proposed Basin Plan, the Prime Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard, in August 2010 committed to 
the purchase of water entitlements from willing sellers, where required, so that current holders of 
water entitlements would be not be financially disadvantaged from increases in environmental flows 
due  to  water  reform  [Hunt,  2010].  This  commitment  is  estimated  to  increase  the  Australian 
government’s budget for the purchase of water entitlement from its current $3.1 billion to between 
about $6.5 billion and $8.9 billion [Grafton, 2010].  
 
7. Concluding Remarks: Opportunities for Reform 
Water markets have developed in both the US west and the Murray-Darling Basin in response to 
water scarcity. Necessary conditions for the existence of such markets include: (1) Decoupling of the   33 
use of water from land rights; (2) regulatory support for water trading; and (3) large water storage 
facilities and conveyance systems that provide ability to trade both upstream and downstream and 
over time. Trade has expanded in both markets in recent years, but especially in the Murray-Darling 
Basin following institutional reforms and during a decade-long drought where trade represents over 
20% of the total volume of surface water extracted in 2007-08.  
 
The gains from trade from both markets are substantial and have allowed for a substantially greater 
value of use from the water available. During the decade-long drought in the Murray-Darling Basin 
water trade has allowed high value irrigation uses, such as for horticulture, to continue during a severe 
drought  because  of  transfers  from  broad-acre  agriculture.  Reduced  water  availability  reflected  in 
higher water market prices, has also induced productivity improvements that have allowed irrigators 
to maintain their gross value of production with a fraction of the extractions that they previously 
enjoyed.  In the US, the most arid and most urbanized states, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, 
and Texas have active water markets, with trades of committed water annually ranging between 5% 
and 15% of total state freshwater diversions. Over $4.3 billion (2008 $) was spent or committed by 
urban buyers between 1987 and 2008, with nearly $4.18 billion spent by urban buyers in the five key 
states indicated above.   
 
Despite the clear benefits of water markets, their use in terms of trades across rural and urban uses is 
limited in both the US west and the Murray-Darling Basin. As a result, water is not allocated to its 
highest value in use and much more expensive alternatives to supplying water to urban communities, 
such as desalination have been implemented. In the case of the US west, the restraints in trade are 
primarily institutional while in Australia they are primarily choices made by state governments to 
avoid the objections to trade by some rural communities. In both countries, political opposition to   34 
greater water markets is due to fears about third-party impairment yet trade restrictions impose their 
own costs. 
 
Third-party effects of trade are important and are, typically, not fully considered in private market 
transactions.  Nevertheless, existing imbalances in water allocation are indicated by the continuing 
price differentials between agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban trades in the US and by 
the higher prices paid by urban water consumers compared to rural users during normal flow years in 
Australia.  These  imbalances,  coupled  with  growing  pressure  to  provide  more  water  to  meet 
environmental, urban, and recreational demands, as well as the high economic and environmental cost 
of alternative water sources such as desalinization, show there is a great need for research on water 
markets. Attention should be directed to finding ways to promote water trade while at the same time 
addressing legitimate third-party concerns, especially conflicts between consumptive and in situ uses 
of water.  As history has shown in both countries, institutional innovation is feasible and additional 
information about the size, duration, and distribution of third-party effects can better address concerns 
about the impact of water markets and water reform.    35 
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Median Price  $60  $15  $239  $117 
Mean Price  $154  $45  $354  $199 
Number of 
Observations  229  239  1,140  215 
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Difference in ML 
(2008 $) 
Yearly Gain of a 5% Transfer 
of Irrigation Water to Urban 
Users at 22-Year Median 




Year (2008 $) 
AZ  3,133,044   $14.28  $2,236,598  $25,252,731 
CA  19,365,667   $32.72  $31,680,746  $77,992,925 
CO  12,334,820   $191.94  $118,380,995  $33,660,033 
NV  1,911,897  $142.50  $13,622,001  $19,092,630 
TX  10,780,633  $16.34  $8,805,878  $34,065,103 
 
 
 
 